The idea of these issues is to offer a broad view of recent foundational work in the many branches of the decision sciences, from evolutionary game theory to behavioral decision theory to classical foundational work on axiomatic accounts of decision under uncertainty. The contributors include both philosophers engaged in theoretical or experimental work and decision scientists with an interest in foundations.
Contents of the first issue
L. Bovens and W. Rabinowicz, The puzzle of the hats.
S. Huttegger, B. Skyrms, R. Smead, K. Zollman, Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling vs. partial pooling.
P. Maher, Bayesian probability.
N-E. Sahlin, A. Wallin and J. Persson, Decision science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theory.
T. Seidenfeld, M.J. Schervish, J.B. Kadane, Coherent choice functions under uncertainty.
I. Levi, Probability logic, logical probability and inductive support.
I. Gilboa, A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler, Rationality of belief: Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality.
D. Samet, S5 knowledge without partitions.
J. Baron, Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior.
H. Arló-Costa and J. Helzner, Ambiguity aversion: The explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities.
Contributors to the second issue
S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger, A. Hájek and M. Smithson, J. Joyce, E. McClennen, C. Bicchieri, A. Rustichini, P.J. Hammond, G. Gigerenzer, J. Collins, and W. Spohn.